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3. conclusion
from the results of our examination we can conclude that in the classical urbanization phase 
– according to the axioms in a far greater scale, that is generally accepted – we can observe 
the early commencement of suburban processes. The communities falling under the ’im-
mediate urbanization zone’, as well as the communities falling under the ’broader urbaniza-
tion zone’ can be interpreted – as early as during the period of 1900-1945 – as parts of a spe-
cial suburban area. in any case, this study should be regarded as preliminary. in the future, 
the authors aim to collect ’raw material’ for their future research, based chiefly on archi-
val sources in order to better understand the character of that suburban processes emerged 
clearly even in the first half of the 20th century by distinguishing communities falling under 
’industrial area’, ’labourer, employee and holiday-maker colonies’ and the ’agricultural sup-
ply area of the city’. however, this preliminary study – especially the spatial and chronolog-
ical identification of zones – and the characteristics of their spreading – may be suitable for 
specifying a model of the so-called ’evolutionary school of thought’ on urbanization phases 
by means of a historical approach.
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The euro’s poliTicAl econoMy relevAnce 
This paper discusses the political economy relevance of the European common currency. Poli-
tics are just as important as economics – if not more important – to guarantee the longevity of 
a shared currency. The euro is clearly a political construct and its first significant crisis demon-
strated that its survival is not only a political issue but also that it needs further political coor-
dination among the Eurozone member states.
1. historical Background
in a full monetary union, the other extreme, participating currencies disappear and are re-
placed by a single currency managed by a common central bank. The main advantages of a 
monetary union are a reduced exchange rate risk (as companies and citizens can be certain 
that the exchange rates remain unchanged) and no more exchange costs. The biggest disad-
vantage is that participating countries lose some of their key policy instruments for regu-
lating the economy by delegating their right of making monetary policy and setting interest 
rates to a central body – in our case the european central Bank in frankfurt.
relinquishing a country’s sovereignty for a monetary union is by no means a novel phe-
nomenon; in 1867 the uk, france and the usa – the three leading powers of the time – 
had already contemplated the idea of introducing a single world currency. The idea was 
soon abandoned as unrealistic. monetary unions have come and gone on all continents. 
The four colonies of new england, on the east coast of the current usa, established one in 
1750 by recognising each other’s currencies. a more noteworthy one was the latin mone-
tary union of the late 19th century, created on france’s initiative between the countries of 
Belgium, Bulgaria, greece, france, italy and switzerland. This franc-zone (somewhat simi-
lar to what was in effect the informal deutschmark-zone in the 1960s and ‘70s), was charac-
terised by the dominance of one strong currency. The latin monetary union (lmu) had a 
single currency but lacked a common or coordinated monetary policy. officially the lmu 
ended in 1926, but its practical significance disappeared long before that as the anglo-sax-
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on world gradually switched to the so-called gold standard system. The scandinavian mon-
etary union, founded by denmark, norway and sweden in 1873, also proved to be a short-
lived experiment. some monetary unions evolved as nation states emerged, for example that 
of the Prussian-dominated one created by Bismarck for the north german confederation 
and the creation of its customs union (zollverein). under pressure from Bismarck, and af-
ter full german unification in 1871, germans using dozens of different currencies accept-
ed the goldmark as sole legal tender even though the reichsbank did not have exclusive 
competence to print money. Bismarck’s monetary union was very stable, outliving the great 
depression and two world wars. The reason for its stability was simple: behind the curren-
cy was an increasingly unified state. another, often forgotten monetary union between Bel-
gium and luxembourg has been in existence since 1921 and was only “overwritten” by the 
introduction of the euro.
The introduction of the euro was primarily politically motivated, symbolic of the spirit of 
european unity, with some finer considerations in the background: by pooling their mone-
tary policy competences in a common bank, france and the netherlands increased their in-
dependence from the german Bundesbank, which used to dictate european monetary pol-
icy (not by force but rather by market realities). on the other hand, by relinquishing the 
Bundesbank’s hegemony in monetary policy, germany made a beau geste towards europe-
an countries (especially france) anxious about its reunification. The symbolic move of giv-
ing up the d-mark, one of the most successful currencies of all time, served to demonstrate 
germany’s european-ness.
nobel laureate canadian economist robert mundell from 1998 said: “The euro will prob-
ably challenge the dominant position of the dollar, making it the single most important de-
velopment in the international monetary system since World War i, when the dollar took 
over the pound’s role as the leading reserve currency.”1 at this moment this seems like some 
rather bold statement. The us dollar has twice the share of the euro in currency transac-
tions, and maintains its role as the currency of choice for invoicing in international trade, es-
pecially in the oil business. in eu-us trade relations, the dollar is used for settling accounts 
in 80% of bilateral trade.
2. the current economic and Political frameWork
since the euro was introduced, the world economy has undergone major changes, and the 
trends suggest that the unipolar global monetary system based on the dollar’s absolute he-
gemony is shifting towards a bipolar system. The euro has appeared as a competitor to the 
dollar. When it was introduced, the euro became the number two reserve currency over-
night, and has gradually been gaining in strength as such. all this time, the us economy has 
accumulated vast debts vis-à-vis the rest of the world (not least china) and has thus weak-
ened astonishingly. The us current account deficit is double (6%) the historic high record-
1 Posen, s. adam, ed.: The euro az five: ready for a global role? special report p18. Washington dc. institute 
for international economics.
ed during the years of the arms race under reagan in the ‘80s. The united states has turned 
from the world’s biggest lender to the world’s biggest debtor, which shaved off about half of 
the dollar’s value (against the euro) in just a few years. 
The international clout of a currency is determined not solely by its role as a reserve curren-
cy. a clear indication of the euro’s worldwide acceptance is its share in the international bond 
market (i.e. in the market of non-bank loans), where it already stole the show in early 1999 
when – for a brief period – most bonds were issued in euros and not dollars. in the years pri-
or to the euro’s introduction, the situation was just the opposite: european currencies strug-
gled to maintain their position, naturally competing against each other, while the dollar gained 
ground to the detriment of the yen. With the introduction of the euro, the dollar had a new 
competitor to face, one which has been advancing with giant strides. for non-eurozone issuers 
the rule of thumb, however, is the following: when the target investors are european, the bonds 
are issued in euro, when it is a global issue (including europe) the dollar is preferred. 
countries with close trading or institutional ties with the eurozone generally use the eu-
ro as their key currency for influencing exchange rates, invoicing and payments (in addi-
tion to their own currencies, of course). lebanon, egypt and israel all opted for euro-based 
loans in the international money market. nevertheless, on the international scene, the eu-
ro still only plays a fundamentally regional role. it serves as a secondary currency in central 
and south-eastern europe and in parts of the Balkans and the mediterranean, which is only 
logical as the deutschmark, and to a lesser extent the austrian schilling or the french franc, 
used to play the same role.
europe is far from being unified, both culturally and economically. europe’s markets are 
not uniform, which impairs its international clout. however, this is not the main obstacle 
preventing the euro from becoming the world’s leading currency. The real stumbling-block 
is that it is a currency without a country.
Politics are just as important as economics – if not more important – in positioning a cur-
rency on the global scene. eurozone members are yet to sing from the same hymn sheet  in-
ternationally, especially at forums such as the g7 or the imf. The euro is a currency created 
by politicians but lacking a political image. 
even economic policy strategy is a matter of deep controversy in europe. The “growth ver-
sus balance” question is not unique to europe; the usa faces the same dilemma. in his essay 
of 20052, daniel griswold, research fellow at the cato institute, went as far as to argue that, 
in the light of historic experience, the current accounts imbalance was a precondition to the 
growth of the us economy. griswold analysed economic figures from the past two and a half 
decades and concluded that the growing deficit regularly yielded increased growth and em-
ployment. in comparison with the record us deficit of 620 billion, in 2004 germany accu-
mulated a global surplus of usd 200 million, but with an unemployment rate of over 11%. 
(The last time the us saw such a high unemployment rate was in 1982, when it had a negligi-
ble 5 billion usd deficit.) The usa, as the world’s strongest economic power and the holder 
2 daniel griswold: Bad news on the trade deficit often means good news on the economy. p. 1-3. free trade 
Bulletin, no 14. 14, january 11, 2005.
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of the number one global currency, is in many respects in a different position from europe, 
especially since europe is troubled by the peculiar situation of the two arms of economic 
policy moving to different beats. monetary policy – i.e. the setting of interest rates (with a 
direct impact on economic growth and unemployment) – is made in frankfurt by the euro-
pean central Bank, with the governments having no say whatsoever. The strings moving the 
other arm of economic policy, budgetary policy (i.e. what the state spends money on) are in 
the hands of the 28 governments. The european commission is caught in between, trying 
to coordinate and orientate national budgetary policies by sanctioning member states that 
overspend and allow their budgetary deficit to exceed 3% of gdP. 
how the rules supposed to guarantee fiscal stability in the euro area can be enforced and 
reinforced is a critical issue. news is regularly coming from Brussels about the stability pact 
and its bodyguard, the excessive budgetary deficit procedure. This is no coincidence: at any 
given time as many as a dozen member states – some already in the eurozone – are in viola-
tion of the budget deficit ceiling.
The rules of the stability pact were proposed by germany, wary of member states with 
poorer economic track records. germany had to convince its citizens that the euro would 
be just as hard a currency as the d-mark was, and would not be jeopardised by other euro 
area countries under any circumstances. essentially, the pact is a complex supervisory sys-
tem to prevent crises through member states constantly keeping an eye on each other, with 
the excessive deficit procedure acting as a deterrent. The pact was born as a compromise 
between germany and france. The germans managed to realise their pet project and have 
their pact adopted, but the sanctions (fines) for offenders finally agreed upon were not 
quite the deterrent originally envisaged. firstly, sanctions are not automatic, but depend 
on the discretionary decision of ministers of finance. secondly, the time until the depos-
it becomes a fine is so long that it hardly forces governments to make the necessary cor-
rections. countries afraid of being sanctioned thus have time to explain the reasons be-
hind their deficit and avoid being fined. The sanctions foreseen in the pact have never re-
ally been applied in practice; the two big eurozone economies of france and germany got 
off cheap, which largely discredited the pact. People started questioning the point of hav-
ing the pact and whether its rules could be enforced. The problems surrounding the stabil-
ity and growth pact are often traced back to the maastricht convergence criteria, which – 
for the sake of simplicity and clarity – set objectives that disregarded real economic proc-
esses. The key shortcoming of the pact, critics say, is its inability to respond to changing 
economic circumstances in a flexible manner. This rigidity is most apparent during reces-
sion or years of stagnation, when the pact leaves little room for manoeuvre to stimulate 
the economy as such measures could temporarily increase the budget deficit. 
“The euro is nothing more than a system of fixed exchange rates covered by a glossy coat 
of political paint. The malfunctioning rules of the euro area unite countries that would oth-
erwise be economically incompatible and which could easily be wrecked by a handful of glo-
bal hedge funds. The luck of the euro is that – for the time being – it is not in the interest of 
hedge funds to do so”.3 such views are easy to come across in the european – especially the 
British – press. The euro will disappear – american financial investors say. are all of these 
opinions nonsensical, or is there some truth in it? 
historical experience shows that monetary unions are successful when they have among 
their members at least one economic power-house acting as the engine. central institutions 
are also needed to control and enforce the rules. The most successful ones are preceded by 
a political union, as in the case of the usa, the uk or germany. Price and wage flexibility 
is a fundamental criterion, so that wages can be limited in poorly performing regions, just 
as inter-regional transfers can be useful. fixing and applying criteria on economic conver-
gence also prove to be necessary. in the eurozone, we can hardly talk about real flexibility of 
labour markets, just as we cannot talk about a political union either. The eu budget is not 
designed for major income transfers either, as it only disposes of 1% of gdP. The eurozone 
meets all of the remaining conditions. The us federal budget is around eur 3.3 trillion, 
compared with the eu “federal” budget of roughly 120 billion euros, a good part of which is 
transferred to non-eurozone countries. The difference between the internal transfer capabil-
ities of the two monetary unions is obvious. on the other hand, in the absence of a europe-
an identity, it is much harder to convince a german factory worker of the benefits of finan-
cially supporting Portuguese fishermen than to explain to a californian why it is important 
to help the good people of utah. 
one can observe serious shortcomings in the operation of the european monetary union. 
These are partly caused by the imperfections of the institutional setup, and partly due to the 
increasing disparities within the euro area in terms of inflation, productivity, and growth 
rate. (The fact that spain has accumulated a 9% current account deficit while germany has 
a 9% surplus, also speaks volumes.) The gaps are growing, even though they should be di-
minishing, as we have seen. to make things worse, europe is losing ground versus the us in 
terms of competitiveness. Both problems can be traced back to the same roots: the unwill-
ingness of certain member states to carry out the necessary reforms and push ahead with 
modernisation. Prior to the introduction of the euro, governments were all for reforms as 
their participation in the single currency was at stake. italians even had to pay a one-off ‘euro 
levy’ and they did not take to the streets in protest. as soon as people had the euro notes in 
their hands, the purse-strings came loose again. With the disappearance of national curren-
cies depreciation is no longer a monetary policy option; the only instrument governments 
have at their disposal is to dismantle labour market obstacles and allow competition in all 
sectors, in other words to strengthen competitiveness through exposure to market forces. 
at the time of the creation of the monetary union, it was generally believed that the suc-
cess of the euro would hinge on two things. first and foremost on the reform of european 
markets: dismantling the welfare and bureaucratic rules that prevent the economy from un-
leashing its potential. secondly, on building stronger political integration. The first is im-
portant because countries changing over to the euro lose the option of depreciating their 
3 in: attila marján: europe’s destiny, 2010. p. 243
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national currency but must remain able to respond flexibly to changes in the world around 
them. The second is important because a successful stability-oriented economic policy re-
quires social and political legitimacy. When preparing the introduction of the single curren-
cy, political union was temporarily taken off the agenda – in order to prevent national gov-
ernments from exerting political pressure – the central Bank was given full independence: 
nobody can just walk into the eurotower in frankfurt to do a bit of lobbying. as a comple-
mentary measure, the stability pact was adopted with the aim of reining in member state 
overspending. as we can see, the institutional framework is built on mutual distrust: com-
munity institutions without political legitimacy act as the guardians of economic stability 
vis-à-vis the politically legitimate member states that are not to be trusted. The question is, 
how long can this arrangement be maintained, when will the steam blow the lid off and who 
will get scalded when it does? one potential solution – call it an escape route, if you will – is 
to continue with political integration. But an even more pressing question is, if political in-
tegration continues, what will it mean for managing the economies of the eurozone: stability 
or a spending spree? despite all of these difficulties, i believe that political integration should 
not be rushed only for the survival of the monetary union; the euro can wait for slower po-
litical integration, but not for slow market integration.
as the world’s most powerful banker, us federal reserve chairman Ben Bernanke wrote, 
“we must accept the eurozone for what it is: a bold political project, which is not your text-
book optimum currency zone, but works nonetheless, and as such cannot be judged by sole-
ly economic aspects but as part of the whole european project.”4
The euro was created by politics – and what a good deed it was. Politics must also help 
preserve it, but not by taking the easy way out and exercising direct political control over 
exchange rate policy; instead, focus needs to be on completing internal market integra-
tion and agreeing to a higher degree of coordination of member-state economic policies. 
as andré sapir and jean Pisani-ferry put it: the euro area needs fewer routine proce-
dures and more ability to act in times of real crises5. The eurozone’s approach to economic 
changes and political changes (such as enlargement) is still very legalistic, and still has no 
international strategy and proper representation in fora like the imf. more profound eco-
nomic coordination need not mean full harmonisation as that would impair the members’ 
ability to conduct an economic policy best suited to their own conditions and econom-
ic cycles. and certainly should not mean the hindering of the central Bank’s functioning, 
but coordination of structural reforms. The euro is not only an important symbol and an 
economic stabiliser, but should also be the stepping-stone to more coherent european ac-
tion on the international scene. it is not only the driving force behind economic integra-
tion, but also enhances european identity and reinforces europe’s global role. as ottmar 
issing puts it: Der Euro “is still an experiment whose outcome seems likely to remain un-
certain for a considerable time to come.”6
4 in: attila marján: europe’s destiny, 2010. p. 239.
5 Pisani-ferry, jean, et al.: coming of age: report on the euro area, Bruegel Blueprint 4. p.4. 2008, Brussels
6 ottmar issing: europe: common money – Political union? p. 6. european central Bank, 1999. 
The eurozone experienced its deepest crisis as from 2008. The european commission, 
the european central Bank and member states had to put in place a series of policy re-
forms to save the common currency and to get eurozone economy back on track. it be-
came obvious that the political and economic structure behind the currency union was 
insufficient and needed a significant overhaul and reinforcement. This recognition helped 
pave the way to a genuine economic union and gave a new impetus to plans to get closer 
to a european political union. 
3. euroPean economic integration in Political PersPective
economy and politics walk hand in hand in the process of european integration. This has 
been clearly seen during the years of the euro crisis. during the worst crisis ever experienced 
by the eu as from 2008, the euro was not seen as the solution, rather than the source of the 
problem. But in fact, the lesson from the recent malaise is that the policy system behind the 
common currency needs significant reinforcement. 
The euro is one of the most sophisticated results of the process of modern european in-
tegration. it is also a symbol of peaceful collaboration between european countries, which 
has been accompanied by, or has resulted in, unprecedented levels of peace, stability and 
prosperity in europe. 
in order to restore confidence in the single currency zone, a high-level fiscal union must 
be created, which will require further measures of economic integration, such as the crea-
tion of a european finance minister, a far bigger eu budget, and an effective bank supervi-
sory authority at euro-zone level. not all members will be able or willing to go that far in the 
medium term. a two-speed europe has already come into existence in reality with the uk’s 
decision to stand aside. nevertheless, the dynamics of integration is uncertain. This is partly 
because the alliance between the 18 current members of the eurozone is not a stable forma-
tion per se; for many of them, the bar will be set too high, and they will not be able to accept 
the degree of harmonisation needed. an additional factor is that integration is to proceed on 
an intergovernmental – rather than supranational – basis, and there will be a need to clarify 
the roles of the eu bodies, in particular those of the european commission. 
despite its undoubted successes, modern european integration is – in historical terms – a 
fragile construct. The main reason for this is the absence of a precise self-definition. europe 
is still a nascent formation, consisting of political compromises, a common system of law, a 
common economic zone, and a collection of political and institutional responses to crises. 
although the peoples of europe have lived side by side for thousands of years, they do not 
share traditions, living myths, a common identity or language; nor do they project a single 
image towards the outside world. The political class and the intellectual elite are just as di-
vided: some want more europe, while others think that even the present level of cooperation 
is far greater than desirable. The underlying reason is that no one has a clear picture of the 
function, goal and future development of the eu; there is no agreed vision.
By creating the euro (which was in many – especially in economic – respects either an ir-
responsible enterprise or a visionary act, depending on one’s perspective), europe crossed 
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the rubicon: it pushed integration to a point of no return where it either presses on with 
a fiscal and political union or must bear the dire economic and social consequences of a 
break-up of the common currency.
clearly, the present crisis is one of the most serious ones in the history of european inte-
gration. it is fundamentally a political crisis rather than a purely economic one. it is the con-
sequence of a downward spiral of political and economic problems that mutually reinforce 
each other. at its centre lies a weakness of political vision in the eu and in the eurozone. in 
economic terms, europe is better placed than the usa; yet it is the eurozone that has be-
come the epicentre of the crisis7. history teaches us that monetary unions are unsustainable 
without political coordination and a fiscal union: a major economic crisis has now made this 
painfully clear to the eurozone too.
in the history of european integration, crises have acted as the triggers of major political 
and institutional changes. europe and the eu face many external and internal challenges, 
the scale of which has grown in recent decades (greater international competition, a whole 
series of demographic, social and budgetary problems). member states have often made fee-
ble and belated responses to such challenges with delayed reforms and poor management of 
immigration and demographic trends. at the same time the european union has not been 
more robust either (see weak and eventually failed policy visions as the lisbon programme, 
diplomatic and geopolitical difficulties due to the lack of a common eu position, years of 
impasse after the failed european constitutional project, etc.)
The question is whether the present crisis, which threatens the existence of the most im-
portant achievement of european integration – the common currency –, will lead to a “quan-
tum leap” towards closer political integration and a multi-speed europe. it may indeed re-
sult in any of the two.
in the medium term, the whole of europe must prepare itself for a decade of sluggish eco-
nomic growth. The gap in economic, social and political development within the eurozone 
will only widen unless there is a major change of direction in the integration process. in the 
long term, the european welfare state is unsustainable in its present form (cf. ageing and 
shrinking populations, budgetary over-extension, an increasing competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis asia). for this reason alone, it would seem sensible to pool european resources and 
to aim for a common european political and geopolitical agenda. But that will be the result 
of economic necessity rather than rationality.
a lot of discussion is taking place about political union. But one thing has to be clear: not 
any form european political union should or could mean the formation of a regional world 
government or the elimination of europe’s nation states. The nation state is a european in-
vention, and europe’s nations will never be dissolved into an all-embracing pan-european 
political unity – if for no other reason than because for europeans a sense of european iden-
tity barely exists, and europe does not have a common language like the united states does. 
Political union could mean closer political integration, a real common foreign policy, a re-
7 allen, franklin, et al. Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic 
Policies. london: cePr, 2011. 
al european (or eurozone) president, real european parliamentary elections, a real (perhaps 
eurozone) budget, and a truly common economic policy. it could also mean unified euro-
pean representation (a single seat and a single voice) in international organisations as well as 
stronger pan-european symbolism in daily life. The euro would still not be backed by a real 
country, but there would be regional integration with a far stronger political profile. 
currently, the key question concerning the future of european integration is whether or not 
a currency without a country is viable. The european union has tried to establish a monetary 
union without a political union, but it has become increasingly clear that both are needed – or 
neither. some thought that this ambiguous situation would lead to a great crisis, forcing the 
eu to establish closer political integration. That is to say, what cannot be achieved through nice 
words, will happen under pressure – as has been the case so many times before. angela merkel 
has a point saying that if the present crisis leads to the end of the euro, this would result in the 
collapse of european integration as a whole, at least in its present form8. 
not only is the common currency without a country; it also has no backing in the form of 
political institutions or even the basic foundations of economic integration. The eu barely has 
a budget: in a modern market economy, the budget amounts to 40-50 percent of gdP, while 
the eu budget amounts to just one percent of european gdP. moreover, money is not spent 
on things that a “normal” budget would target, but for very different purposes, such as farm 
subsidies – which still account for almost every second euro spent. These factors add up to a 
budget ill equipped to make significant transfers between eurozone members at different lev-
els of development and in different stages of the economic cycle. an even more important de-
ficiency of the eurozone is its lack of a common economic policy and the cumbersome deci-
sion-making with unanimity required, for instance, to adopt common fiscal rules9.
a closer union in fiscal and economic policy terms – a european finance minister, eu-
robonds, common financial supervision, and a closely coordinated economic policy – seems 
inevitable, as does, in certain respects, a political union. all this will require a new treaty, an 
amended ecB statute, and above all political will. closer integration may certainly be envis-
aged in the form of a multi-speed union. a radically different european space is appearing 
before our very eyes. and in this new space the role of europe’s major powers will change, 
and there will also be a shift in the relative clout of countries. germany may be the greatest 
beneficiary of the reshuffle with its new-found regional primacy. german political elite sup-
ports closer integration, which will help mitigate fears of german hegemony, but the ger-
man-french tandem will no longer be regarded as a partnership of equals. history (and ne-
cessity) has made the economy – and the common currency – the driving force of federal-
ism, rather than political institutional development or the construction of a european cul-
tural identity, which would have favoured the french. The french wanted the euro – and the 
whole process of integration – as a means of keeping the germans in check, but in reality 
8 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/if-the-euro-fails-europe-fails-merkel-says-eu-must-be-bound-
closer-together-a-784953.html
9 allen, franklin. Life in the Eurozone: With or Without Sovereign Default? florence: european university insti-
tute, 2011.
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the opposite happened. The principles of france’s european policy – the multiplication of 
french power and capacities at the european and global level coupled with categorical inter-
governmentalism – have been sorely wounded. 
historically speaking, hostility, rivalries and war are the norm on the european continent; 
periods of peaceful co-existence are the exception. also, in historical terms, modern euro-
pean integration (voluntary cooperation between sovereign states, based on the respect for 
common laws, and which was launched after World War ii with a strengthening of econom-
ic and commercial relations but with the primary purpose of pacifying germany) is a vul-
nerable formation. as a consequence, peace and solidarity on the european continent may 
soon be replaced by growing hostility – if the economic situation deteriorates and becomes 
crisis-ridden in a geopolitical milieu that is increasingly unstable. The fate of the boldest 
achievement and symbol of eu integration – the common currency – is intertwined with 
the fate of integration as a whole: an anarchic collapse of the euro would be accompanied by 
the break-up of the eu and political paralysis in europe. The euro is fundamentally a polit-
ical and symbolic creation; in its present form, it does not have firm economic foundations. 
in light of the above it is in the interest of the eu to save the euro by establishing a strong 
economic union. With its present architecture, rules and stakeholders (whether they are the 
eu-28, the eu-26 or the eu-18), the european union is incapable of moving forward at the 
right speed and depth. in addition, european public opinion gives a cool reception to any in-
itiative coming from above, from Brussels. The european union – it seems – faces two pos-
sible scenarios in the long term. under the first scenario, it passively allows the centrifugal 
forces (markets, member-state sabotage, public disinterest) to break it up or it ceases to exist 
in its present form, with the unplanned termination of the euro. all of this would be tempo-
rarily accompanied by an extremely grave crisis. under the second scenario, in the extended 
lands of charlemagne a new intergovernmental treaty may be adopted, resulting in strong 
economic policy integration and preserving the euro. The second and third groups of coun-
tries could join later based on new conditions (which would be far stricter than they are to-
day). The historical and european lesson is that regional integration projects are far from ev-
erlasting, and often the temporary break-up of a poorly designed form of integration is the 
key to a restructured formation that guarantees long-term survival. 
Jan pastwa
The role of The visegrAd cooperATion 
in eu foreign relATions
The Visegrad Group reflects the ongoing efforts of the countries of the Central European region 
to cooperate in a number of fields of common interest within the European integration. Despite 
the diverse roots of their religious and social backgrounds, particular economic and geopolitical 
interests, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been part of a com-
mon civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values. The V4 concentrates on such issues as 
the future of cohesion policy, strategic programming and the regional development policy. The 
major task is to promote the EU growth potential by pursuing the most important initiatives 
such as completion of the Single Market or governance of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
The Visegrad Group should serve to better coordinate the V4 positions with regard to EU pol-
icy towards EaP countries, in particular Ukraine, Belarus and the Western Balkans. Anoth-
er important aspect of the V4 cooperation within EU foreign relations concerns not only Cen-
tral-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but also the collaboration with Japan, China, Israel or 
Egypt. Concerning the short-term challenges, it is essential to focus on networking and improv-
ing people-to-people contacts between Eastern and Central Europe through various national 
programmes and initiatives of individual V4 partners. From the Polish perspective, the aim of 
the Visegrad Group is to further strengthen the V4 position within international forums and 
to achieve a further EU enlargement. Concerning the issue of the V4 geopolitical position, it is 
natural that they will support the further sustainability of the EU project, the EU enlargement 
policy and the development of neighbourhood policy. The V4 should cooperate with the East-
ern Partnership area in order to successfully complete the EU integration process which later re-
quires further transformation. 
1. introduction
one of the priorities of the visegrad group (also known as the ‘visegrad four’ or sim-
ply ‘v4’) is to engage in regional activity through the european union, which constitutes a 
unique form of regional and political cooperation. each v4 partner has the same opportu-
nity of potential for action during the rotating Presidency which runs from early july to late 
june the following year. The visegrad cooperation started in february 1991 when President 
